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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNI'J1ED FACTORS, A CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
-vs. -
T. C. ASSOCIATES, INC., A Corpor-
a ti on, and HARRY R. ULMER, JR., 
PAUL J. SUGAR, and SAM HERS-
COVITZ, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by United Factors against 
the defendant Corporation and Harry R. Ulmer, Jr. 
and Sam Herscovitz as individuals, on a guarantee 
agreement for T. C. Associates, Inc., a Corporation; that 
prior to the matter being tried on its merits, a stipu-
lation was entered into which the appellants believe to 
be contrary to the laws of the State of Utah, and a 
Motion was filed to vacate the Stipulation and to allow 
the appellants to file an Amended Answer and Counter-
claim and to set aside the stipulation; all of which was 
denied by the lower Court and a Judgment was en-
tPred based on the stipulation against the appellants as 
individuals and in favor of the respondent, from which 
the appellants as individuals appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following the appellants Motion in open Court on 
the 15th day of August, 1967, the Third District Judge, 
Joseph G. Jeppson, denied appellants Motion to set aside 
the Stipulation and for leave to file an Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim and granted Judgment to the respon-
dent upon their oral Motion in open Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower Court's Order 
denying appellants the right to file an Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim and for an Order setting aside the 
Stipulation and for an Order, ordering the case to be 
remanded back to the lower Court so that the appellants 
can assert all of their defenses both legal and equitable 
which it was not allowed to do in the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That appellants, who were the defendants m the 
lower Court, will be ref erred to in this Brief as appel-
lants, and that the plaintiff and respondent in this Brief 
will hereinafter be ref erred to as respondent. 
T. C. Associates, Inc. was a Utah Corporation doing 
business in Utah, and that the officers and incorporators 
of said Corporation were Harry R. Ulmer, Jr., Paul J. 
Sugar and Sam Herscovitz; that said Corporation was 
engaged in the furniture business with its principal of-
fices in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Sam Herscovitz and Harry R. Ulmer, Jr. as indi-
viduals signed a written guaranty with the respondent, 
United Factors, vvhich was later modified as to amount 
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hy verbal agreement of the parties limiting the joint lia-
bilit.v as guaranteed to $10,000.00 for the account of 
Bailey-Schmitz for the extension of credit to the T. C. 
Associates, Inc. Corporation; that said guarantees were 
signed by Harry R. Ulmer, Jr. and Sam Herscovitz on 
May 3, 1965, and pursuant to said guarantees T. C. As-
sociates, Inc. did commence to purchase merchandise 
from Bailey-Schmitz. 
That Bailey-Schmitz did then assign its accounts 
recPivable of T. C. Associates, Inc. to United Factors, a 
New York Corporation, which is the respondent in this 
Brief. 
That without any knowledge or information and 
without the consent of the appellants, either corporately 
or individually, the Evans and Black Carpet Mills ac-
count was also sold and assigned to United Factors, 
who then proceeded to use the same guarantee of Harry 
R. Ulmer, Jr. and Sam Herscovitz even though it was 
not accepted nor authorized by the said appellants herein. 
(R30, 31 Answer) 
That prior to June 8th, 1966, T. C. Associates, Inc. 
became delinquent in the payment of its accounts and 
the respondent by and through its attorney commenced 
legal action against T. C. Associates, Inc. and the indi-
viduals who were the alleged guarantors; Legal action 
was commenced by an Acceptance of Service of the Sum-
mons only by the appellants attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, 
but no Complaint was served on appellants by mailing 
to appellants or any of its authorized agents nor by 
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leaving a copy ~with tlw Ckrk of the Conrt. (R. 1, 2, an<l 
3) Said Acceptance 1rns <lat Pd ,June 8th, 1966. 
Shortly after ap1wllants attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, 
accepted service of tlH' Summons only, he was hospital-
ized for an apparent heart attack. The appellants were 
withont any l::nowledge of the AccqJtance of said Service 
by their attorrn·~-- On Jnne 30, 19()(), a default Judgment 
was entered against all of the appellants who were 1111-
awarc of any pending legal 8.ction brought against them 
because they had no knowle<lge of a Summons being 
S<'l'Yed on Pete N. Ylahos. Appellants attorney, Pete N. 
Vlaho;s having been hospitalizrd was unable to notify the 
appellants of the Smmnons because of his illness. (Tran-
script Page 9 and Affidavit of Attorney Pete N. Vlaho~ 
attached hereto.) 
The appc~Jlants first became aware of the Judgment 
after it wm; entered against them and immediately there-
after did retain Attorney Herschel J. Saperstein to rep-
resent them. AttornPy Herschel J. Saperstein by proper 
Motion in the lower Court had the Default Judgment 
set aside but the Order Appointing the Receiver was not 
vacatPd. Owing to the failure of the lower Court to 
vacak its Order Appointing Receiver (R17, 18 and 19), 
T. C. Associates, Inc. was compelled to file in Bankruptcy 
in the Ft•deral District Court of Utah. 
On or ahont September 19, 19GG, the appellants, 
Harry R. Ulmer, .Tr. and Sam Herscovitz, as individuals 
did enter into a Stipalation allegedly au accord an<l 
satisfaction for the unpaid debts allegedly due the 
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l'PS])Ondents by the Corporation, T. C. Associates, Inc. 
for which there was no consideration. 
Shortly thereafter appellants Sam Herscovitz and 
Harry R Ulmer, Jr. reengaged Attorney Pete N. Vlahos 
at which point Attorney Herschel J. Saperstein with-
drew as Attorney of Record. Thereupon Attorney Pete 
N. Vlahos made a Motion to vacate the Stipulation and 
permit the appellants to file a Counterclaim and an 
amended Answer which was denied and for which the 
ap1wllants seek relief therefrom. (R43, 44, 45) 
When the lower Court heard appellants Motion as 
:::tated herein the lower Court stated "It did not care about 
the law" (Transcript Page 5) and would not allow the 
presentation of legal authority. 
Upon the Court denying appellants Motion as indi-
cated herein the respondent did then file a Judgment 
from which the appellants as individuals are appealing. 
Appellants Attorney Pete N. Vlahos tried to point 
out to the Court that there were issues of law and fact 
that the Court should hear rather than grant respondent 
a Judgment since T. C. Associates, Inc. had assets in 
the Bankruptcy Court to pay respondent the money due 
it by T. C. Associates when distribution was made. As 
of the date of the writing of this Brief no distribution 
has been made. rrhe Stipulation provided that all pay-
ments made by Appellants apply on the Bailey-Schmitz 
arcount and the balance from the Bankruptcy Court. 
(R 51, 52, 53) 
Respondents attorney by the terms of the Stipulation 
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did n~ceivt~ $500.00 attorn('Y foes. ~When Judgment was 
Pnt<>n'd lw sought another $2,000.00 making the total 
attorney fees $2,500.00 alltogether on an unpaid amount 
of $2,73G.54. 
At the time of appellants Motion to vacate the Stipu-
lation and to allow appellants to file an Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim appellants attorney Pete N. Vlahos 
did rai~:w the issue that the appellants had a good and 
valid defense because of a misjoinder of claims and a 
misjoinde1· of parties and that said statement does not 
appear in the Transcript and is referred to herein by 
Attorney Pete N. Vlahos' Affidavit attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. That the lower Court erred in denying 
appellants Motion to set aside the Stipulation and in 
denying appellants the right to file an Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim. 
POINT 2. That the lower Court erred in granting 
Judgment to the respondent on the Stipulation because 
there was no consideration for said Stipulation even 
though it purported to be an accord and satisfaction of 
the claims of the respective parties. 
POINT 3. That the lower Court erred in denying 
appellants Motion to file an Amended Answer and Coun-
terclaim since there were triable issues of law and fact 
and therefon~ contrary to the laws of the State of Utah. 
POINT 4. That the lower Court erred in denying 
appellants Motion ~when the appellants did in fact have 
a good and valid defense of misjoinder of claims and 
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misjoinder of partit's and therefore contrary to the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
POINrr 5. rrhat the lower Court erred in granting 
rt:spondent a Judgment since the Court had no juris-
uiction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING AP-
PELLANTS MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION 
AND IN DENYING APPELLANTS THE RIGHT TO FILE 
AN AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM. 
Under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
1953 the Code states as follows: 
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
PLEADINGS 
(A) AMENDENTS 
"A party may amend his pleading once as a mat-
ter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calen-
dar, he may so amend it at any time within twenty 
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend his pleadings only by leave of Court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; AND 
LEAVE SHALL BE FREELY GIVEN WHEN 
JUSTICE SO REQUIRES." (Emphasis appel-
lants.) 
'rl1e above Rule has been fairly digested and ex-
plored in Utah law and the Landmark case concerning 
the amending of the pleadings is found in Johnson et. ux. 
v. Brinkerhoff et. al., 57 P.2d 1132, a 1936 Utah Case. 
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One of the points made by the appellant Brinkerhoff 
on the appeal was that Johnson was permitted to intro-
duce a new and different cause of action other than that 
originally sued upon when he filed his second Amended 
Complaint and the Court found that the Amended Com-
plaint was filed before trial and the defendant's Answe1 
thereto was filed before trial of the cause. The Court 
stated on Page 1136: 
"No prejudice is alleged or shown in allowing 
the filing of the second Amended Complaint or 
in refusing to strike such pleading. A more liberal 
rule will be applied in cases where amendments 
are offered under such circumstances than when 
offered during or after trial, where the parties 
may be taken by surprise or handicapped in the 
meeting of new allegations." 
The Court further went on to state on Page 1136: 
"The rule, however is toward liberality in allow-
ance of amendments to pleadings for the purpose 
of permitting a complete adjudication of the mat-
ters in controversy and in the furtherance of 
justice. The rule is well stated in 49 CJ 466, as 
follows: 
'Subject to such limitations as arise from tl;e 
time at which they are sought and from thm 
subject matter, the policy of the law is toward 
liberality in the allowance of amendments and 
to regard them favorably in order that the 
real controversy between the parties may be 
presented, their rights determined, and the 
cause decided on the merits without neces-
sary delay, hence, to allow amendments is 
t . '" the rule; to refuse them, the excep 10n. 
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Justice Folland in the case of Johnson v. Peck, et. 
al., 63 P.2d on Page 253 stated: 
"The policy of the law is toward liberality in the 
allowance of amendments and to regard them 
with favor to the end that the real controversy 
between the parties may be settled. The liberality 
exercised is greatest at the time suit is commenced 
and decreases as the suit progresses." 
That the question of pleadings and amendments to 
pleadings was fully digested in the case of Hancock v. 
Luke et. al., 148 Pac. 452. 
In this case an action was brought by the plaintiff, 
an attorney, who brought an action on a contract and 
the defendant filed a lengthy Answer and no objections 
were interposed by either party to the pleadings until 
the case was called for trial when the plaintiff moved 
for Judgment on the pleadings which Motion was granted 
by the Court and Judgment for the plaintiff was entered 
accordingly. The facts further show that the Attorney 
for the defendant made a Motion to amend the Answer 
and what transpired is quoted on Page 456 as follows: 
"Mr. Armstrong, for defendants: Now we make 
a Motion if the Court please to amend the Answer. 
Mr. Wilson for plaintiff: We wish to resist that 
Motion, of course, Your Honor, because it comes 
too late. In the first place, there isn't anything 
to amend. Mr. Armstrong: There are some alle-
gations in the Answer that we hadn't noticed, 
having been called into the case just lately that, 
may be a little ambiguous. Mr. Snyder (for plain-
tiff): I submit, Your Honor, it is too late now. 
Mr. Wilson: I would like to be heard on it if the 
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Conrt has any idea of entertaining it. The Court: 
It will be overrnle>d. Mr. Armstrong: Take an 
exception. Mr. Wilson: We ask for Judgment, 
Your Honor. The Court: You may have it. Mr. 
Armstrong: Exception. Mr. Wilson: We will 
draw it up later and serve it on counsel. The 
Court: We will just consider ourselves ad-
journed." 
This ·writer asks the Court to notice the similarity 
as to what occurred in the Hancock case and what trans-
pired at the hearing on August 15th, 1967, when appel-
lants attorneys asked the Court as follows: 
Mr. Vlahos: "I may cite various cases concerning 
it." 
The Court: "I do not care about the law, but the 
reason why. (Transcript Page 5) 
and further the Court went on to state on Page 6 of the 
Transcript as follows: 
"The law is no excuse." 
The Court in the Hancock case on Page 456 stated: 
"Why, then, was the offer to amend not timely? 
In case pleadings are assailed, must a party move 
to amend before he is apprised of what the ruling 
of the Court will be 1 We think not. We are of 
the opinion, therefore, that the Motion for leave 
to amend is timely. We are also of the opinion 
that, under the circumstances, it constituted _re-
versible error for the Court to deny the Motion 
for leave to Amend." 
And in setting forth the general law of the case the Court 
stated on Page 457 as follows: 
"We can see no reason whatever why the defend-
ants in this case should be denied the right of 
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amendment when the exercise of that right is 
a matter of daily occurrence in our court of jus-
tice. Trnc, motions for judgments on the plead-
ings may be rare, but that is no reason why the 
right of amendment should be denied when timely 
proposed as in the case at bar." 
The Court in the case of Davis Vincent Ballard, by 
Duane 0. Ballard his Guardian Ad Litem v. Wes Buist 
and Ronald Baxter aka Ronny Baxter, 333 P.2d 1071 
8 Utah 2d, 308, 1959 Utah Case. 
The Brinkerhoff case was cited by the Court in 
allowing the plaintiff upon proper Motion to amend the 
Complaint to allow the Guardian Ad Litem, Duane 0. 
Ballard to represent his minor son, David Vincent Bal-
lard and the Motion was granted and the plaintiff Duane 
0. Ballard was appointed as plaintiff's Guardian Ad 
Litem after which the Guardian Ad Litem moved the 
Court for permission to Amend the Summons and Com-
plaint to show that plaintiff was suing by his Guardian 
Ad Litem since the defendant was a minor and was in 
the Armed Services of the United States and the Court 
denied permission to amend the Summons and Com-
plaint and granted a Motion by respondent's attorney to 
quash the Summons and dismiss the action. 
The Court stated on Page 1073 and 1074 as follows: 
"In the instant case when the Court allowed a 
guardian ad !item to be appointed it should have 
allowed his motion to amend the process and 
pleadings to show that the suit was being prose-
cuted by the infant through his guardian ad litem 
under the prov1s10ns of Rule 4 (h) U.R.C.P. 
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1953 which provides that: 
'At any time in its discretion and upon such 
terms as it deems just, the Court may allow 
any process or proof of service thereof to 
be amended, unless it clearly appears that 
material prejudice would result to the sub-
stantial rights of the party against whom 
the process issued.' " 
And the Court went on further to state Rule 15, 
of the U.R.C.P. 1953 and stated on Page 1047 as follows: 
"The amendments could prejudice none of the 
parties, but could only tend to serve justice. To 
disallow the amendments was an abuse of dis-
cretion. It has always been the rule in this state 
to be liberal in the allowance of amendments to 
the end that there can be a complete adjudication 
of a controversy upon the merits and so that jus-
tice may be served." 
And the Court stated in the Ballard case that the 
matter be remanded and the lower Court was reversed 
with directions to follow the high Court's decision. 
Another case that was similar wherein the Court 
allowed four amended Complaints was in the case of 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Clegg, 
135 P.2d, 919, a 1943 Utah Case: 
The facts are briefly that the defendant was elected 
as treasurer of the Board of Education for Tooele Coun-
ty and on two different occasions he had bonds posted 
with the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 
one for $10,000.00 and one for $20,000.00, and ·with the 
Board of Education's approval the defendant placed 
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said sums of money in the Tooele County State Bank on 
December 24, 1930, and on January 14, 1931. One week 
after the defendant commenced his second term as treas-
urer, the bank closed its doors and failed and the Board 
of Education had on deposit a sum in excess of $141,-
000.00, a portion of which they recovered from the assets 
of the bank and a portion of which they sued the Hart-
ford Accident and Indemnity Company. A settlement of 
$14,500.00 was arrived at after which the Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Company brought action against 
Clegg for Clegg's failure to use care in depositing said 
sums of money and for failure to obtain sufficient se-
curity to see that the bank had ample funds to pay its 
depositors. 
A trial was had in this matter and after the trial 
was over the Court made a minute entry on Page 921 
as follows: 
"The within entitled matter having been by the 
Court taken under advisement, the Court now 
renders its decision that Judgment be entered 
against the plaintiff and in favor of the defend-
ant." 
Thereafter the plaintiff made a motion to amend 
its Complaint which motion over defendant's objection 
was granted by the trial Court, a second amended Com-
plaint was filed and a demurer to it was sustained. De-
murrers to the third amended complaint which was filed 
was also sustained. The fourth amended Complaint which 
was filed sought recovery of $14,500.00 on the theory of 
equitable subrogation and on the fourth amended Com-
plaint the Court awarded Judgment to the Hartford In-
13 
surance Company from which this appeal was taken. 
One of the contentions raised by the defendants 
was that the Court erroneously allowed plaintiff to amend 
to state an entirely new cause of action and the Court 
in deciding this issue' stated on Page 922 as follows: 
"Ho\\'PVer, the rule that a new or different cause 
of action cannot be introduced by amendment can-
not be taken litPrally. As pointed out by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in a recent case, Klopstock 
v. Superior Court, 108 P.2d, 90G, 910, 135 A.L.R. 
318: 
'It is obvious that the unqualified way in 
which the rule is sometimes stated * * * can-
not be accepted; for the most common kinds 
of amendnH'nts are those in which complaints 
are amended that do not state facts sufficient 
to constitute a cause of action, and in these, 
and often in the case of new parties, a new 
cause of action is in fact for the first time 
introduced. All that can be required there-
fore (to use the language of Mr. Pomeroy), 
is that a wholly different cause of action 
shall not be introduced.' " 
And in citing the following case it was stated: 
"In United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 
U.S. G2, 5~~ S. Ct. 278, 280, 77 L.ed. 619, Cardozo 
J., states that the term "cause of action" ma.y 
mean one thing when the question is whether it 
is good upon demurrer, and something different 
when there is a question of the amendment of a 
pleading or of the application of the principle of 
res judicata." 
The Court further went on and stated on Page 922: 
""\Y c have consistently encouraged all proper 
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amendments to pleadings to the end of having a 
full hearing on the merits of the entire contro-
versy. Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 148 Pac. 452." 
Harman v. Yeager, 100 Utah 30, 110 P.2d, 352." 
This trend toward a liberal construction of the 
term is looked upon with favor in other jurisdic-
tions. 
Although the appellants in the instant case does not 
intend introducing a new cause of action the case 
is only cited to show the liberality of the Utah Courts in 
granting leave to amend pleadings with the end result 
being that the parties will be given their day in Court 
and justice will prevail. It is stated in 71 C.J.S. 275: 
"The fact that new matter may have been known 
to the appellant at the time the original pleadings 
was filed is not necessarily sufficient grounds for 
denying the right to amend." 
The case that is almost identical in point both in 
facts and in law is the case that was cited previously 
which is the case of Harman v. Yeager, et. al., 110 P.2d 
352, a 1941 Utah case. 
The facts of the Yeager case are almost similar to 
the procedural circumstances as to the case presently 
before the Court, and the facts briefly are as follows: 
The plaintiff instituted an action against defendant, 
Yeager, and others to quiet title to a small tract of land 
in Salt Lake County. The Complaint was in the usual 
form for actions to quiet title and an Answer was filed 
with no demurrer to the Answer and when the case was 
called for trial plaintiff upon suggestions of trial Court 
moved for a Judgment on the pleadings. Defendant, 
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Yeager, then asked leave to amend their Answer and 
the Court denied the request for leave to amend and 
entered Judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff 
quieting the title. 
Defendants then obtained new counsel who moved 
the Court to vacate the Judgment and hear the cause 
on its merits, tendering a new and an amended Answer. 
The Motion was denied and Yeagers appealed. The Court 
stated on Page 354 as follows: 
''When a demurrer is interposed timely, that is, 
before the cause is set for trial, so that the plead-
ings may be examined and considered and if 
necessary amended where such can be done with-
out serious inconvenience to the parties, the pub-
lic, and the orderly procedure of the Court's 
business, it may be well to examine them quite 
critically and resolve all doubts against the 
pleader." 
The Court further stated on Page 354: 
"But when a party fails until the cause is called 
for trial to demurrer and call the attention of 
the Court and counsel to what he thinks substan-
tial defects in a pleading, the pleading should 
be liberally construed in favor of the pleader with 
all reasonable inference from the facts pleaded 
indulged with a view to a trial on the merits and 
doing substantial justice between the parties." 
And the Court then went on to cite the Hancock case 
which stated: 
"The Courts generally do, and always should, re-
quire the parties to proceed to the merits, if such 
a course is permissable, after getting the allega-
tions and averments contained in the pleadings, 
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and the necessary inferences arising therefrom a 
liberal construction and application." ... 
"Viewing the Motion the ref ore as a speaking 
demurrer, when the answer was held to be bad 
and the defendant sought to amend, they should 
have been granted such right unless under the 
facts admitted there was no reasonable proba-
bility that they could state a defense or make an 
issue on a matter material to plaintiff's cause 
of action." 
There are too numerous cases to cite before this 
Honorable Court; the question that Court's should con-
strue pleadings liberally. Even in view of all these cases 
the lower Court denied appellants Motion to amend its 
Answer and leave to file a Counterclaim. There would 
certainly be no prejudice to either party if appellants 
Motion had been granted, since most of the monies had 
already been paid to the respondent by the appellants 
when the appellants discovered additional information 
that would give them good and valid defenses against 
the allegations made by the respondent. This writer 
believes the Court to be in error in denying appellants 
Motion. 
POINT 2. 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT TO THE RESPONDENT ON THE STIPULA-
TION BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR 
SAID STIPULATION EVEN THOUGH IT PURPORTED TO 
BE AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION OF THE CLAIMS 
OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES. 
As is stated by many writers an accord and satis-
faction is no different than an ordinary contract and 
there must be consideration in order to have an accord 
and satisfaction agreement. 
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In the instant case, the Stipulation that was entere<l 
into was for the Pxact amount dne and owing allegedlv 
to the respondent by the appellants. The Stipulation con-
tains no facts nor recites any statement of any consider-
ation given or sought by either party (R 51, 52, 53). 
This is further substantiated by the Judgment of the 
respondrnt accompanied by his Affidavit which sets forth 
the payments made by the appellants to the respondent 
and is computated ont hy the respondent for the same 
amount that the respondent is claiming (R 55, 56). The 
Stipulation that the appellants signed contained no con-
sideration nor any consideration even if it was an accord 
and satisfaction, said matter has been decided numerous 
times and the following cases are set forth as evidence 
of same. 
In 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction, Section 1, Page 
462, it stated as follows: 
"An 'accord' is an agreement whereby one of the 
parties undertake::; to give or perform, and the 
other to acc1:~pt, in satisfaction of a claim, liqui-
dated or in dispute, and arising either from con-
tract or from tort, something other than or dif-
ferent from what he is, or considers himself, 
entitled to; and a 'satisfaction' is the execution, 
or performance, of such an agreement." 
In 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction, Section 4, Page 
473, it states as follows: 
l . 'd *' *' • "Except where a statute ot ierw1se provi es 
an accord and satisfaction, like any other con-
tract, must, in order to be valid and effectual, 
be founded upon a proper consideration, a~d 
where there is no consideration, the accord is 
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nndPm padr<m, and so invalid and unenforceable. 
The consideration may present itself in any of 
numerous diffcT<'nt shapes or guises, but in some 
form or other it must be present - there must 
be either sonw advantage, or presumed or as-
smned advantage, accruing to the party who 
yields his claim, or some detriment to the other 
party." 
From the citations of the C.J.S. it would appear to 
he analogous to instant case because there was in fact 
no consideration. The Stipulation that was signed was 
no different than what the respondent was already claim-
ing. All that the appellants are seeking at this time is 
that the matter may be heard and tried by a jury with 
all of the faets presented to avoid an unconscionable 
injustice resulting to the appellants. 
In the case of Metropolitan State Bank, Inc. v. Ar-
thur Cox, Tribrme Grain Inc., Sullivan Inc., and William 
E. Rust, 302 P.2d 188, a 1956 Colorado case the Court 
on Page 192, 193 stated as follows: 
"We think it sufficient to direct attention to the 
statement of the Rule as set forth in 1 C.J.S. 
Accord and Satisfaction, Section 3, P. 471 in sup-
f 1 . " port o our cone us10n. 
'Inasmuch as an accord and satisfaction is 
dependent upon contract, and requires a meet-
ing of minds of the parties, the relevant facts 
must be known to both parties, in order to 
render it valid and effectual, and each party 
must be apprised of the contentions of the 
other. So an accord and satisfaction entered 
into through or as a result of mutual mistake 
of fact, ·where such a mistake by one of the 
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parties as to amount to a complete difference 
betw.e~n what he supposed he was receiving 
or g1vmg np and what was in fact received 
or given,. so as to constitute a want of meeting 
of the rnmds or an absence of consideration.' 
* * * 
The Court further stated: 
"An agreement and its performance cannot con-
stitute an accord and satisfaction of a claim or 
demand, the existence of which was unknown to 
the creditor when he made the agreement, nor 
does the giving and receipt of a thing or promise 
amount to or effect an accord and satisfaction 
where it is the result of coercion or what is known 
as "business compulsion." 
As an analogy to the instant case this writer draws 
the Court's attention to the fact that a Motion to set 
aside the Stipulation and for leave to file an Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim would not have been made 
had not facts existed which did not become known to 
the appellants until after the agreement was entered into. 
In the case of Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of the United States, 72 P.2d 1060, 1937 Utah 
case: 
The facts in the instant case although not identical 
to the case at hand show that the plaintiff, an oral sur-
geon, was injured and filed a claim with the defendant 
under an insurance policy he had with the company; he 
claimed a partial disability and some days of total disa-
bility as a result of this injury. Subsequent to this, the 
defendant payed the plaintiff on this claim and later 
the plaintiff claimed total disability which the insurance 
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company refused to pay and the lower court held in 
favor of the plaintiff from which the insurance company 
appt·aled claiming the defense of accord and satisfaction. 
The Court in affirming the lower Court's decision 
stated on Page 1067 and 1068 as follows: 
''His stating on the claim form and admitting 
the correctness of a statement which specified an 
item in pursuance of the claim for partial disa-
bility would seem at the most to involve only an 
opinion of the plaintiff at the time he signed the 
papers that he was for the time partially disabled. 
If, as a matter of ultimate fact, arrived at through 
legal interpretation of provisions of the policy, 
together with a conclusion from the evidence, 
his then opinion against himself was wrong, it 
would not seem to be conclusive." * * * 
Was it an accord and satisfaction 1 An accord is an 
agreement between the parties, one to give a perform-
ance the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment 
or performance in satisfaction of a claim. The "satis-
faction" is the consumation of such agreement. There 
must be consideration for the agreement. Settlement of 
an unliquidated or disputed claim where the parties are 
shown to be apart in good faith presents such consider-
ation. 
"Where the claim is definite and no dispute but 
an admittance of its owing, the agreement to take 
a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction is 
not good unless attended by some consideration. 
In this case we do not see the elements of an ac-
cord and satisfaction." 
In the case of Ralph A. Badger and Company v. 
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Fidelity Building and Loan Association, 75 P.2d 669, a 
1938 Utah Case : 
rrhe facts were that the plaintiff Badger became the 
owner of fifty shares of capital stock known as Investors 
Guarantee Stock which were issued by the defendant 
and which provided that the defendant promised to pay 
upon maturity of the certificate the sum of $5,000.00 
and when the time for maturity arrived the defendant 
refused to pay said $5,000.00 and the plaintiff was 
informed by the defendant that payments were not being 
made on withdrawals and payment on the certificate for 
fifty shares of stock were refused. The plaintiff had 
received these certificate from one Arthur and Cecelia 
LeClerc and had been reissued two twenty-five certifi-
cate stocks and when the Fidelity Building and Loan 
Association refused to honor one of the certificates the 
plaintiff sent the certificates to the Atlas Realty Com-
pany in Ogden, Utah, and sold one of the twenty-five 
shares certificates for $1,250.00, said sum being one-half 
of the value of said certificate. 
The plaintiff later discovered that the Atlas Realty 
Company had acted as agent for the defendant in pro-
curing said certificates and that the money paid there-
fore had been furnished by defendant and the certificate 
had been surrendered to the defendant by the Atlas 
Realty Company and had been cancelled. The plaintiff 
then brought suit to recover the difference between the 
face amount of the certificate and the amount he had 
received from the Atlas Realty Company for the cer-
tificate. 
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The lower Court found for the plaintiff and the 
F'id<'lit:v Building and Loan Association appealed rais-
i i1g' as a defense the accord and satisfaction. The Court 
:-;takd on Page 676 the elements of an accord and satis-
faction and quoted 1 Am. Jur. Page 217, Section 4. 
'''l'he discharge of claims by way of accord and 
satisfaction is dependent upon a contract ex-
pressed or implied; and it follows that the essen-
tials necessary to valid contracts generally must 
be present in a contract of accord and satisfac-
tion. Therefore, the following elements are essen-
tial: (1) A proper subject matter, (2) competent 
parties, (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of 
the parties, and ( 4) a consideration." * * * 
The Court further stated on Page 676: 
"vVhere the claim is definite and no dispute but 
an admittance of its owing, the agreement to take 
a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction is 
not good unless attended by some consideration." 
In the instant case before this Honorable Court it 
will be noted that the Stipulation is identical with the 
amount claimed due and owing by the respondent in 
its complaint; there certainly could not have been any 
consideration for a new agreement which is identical 
with what the respondent was already claiming. There-
fore this writer submits that there was no consideration 
for the Stipulation. 
POINT 3. 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING AP-
PELLANTS MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM SINCE THERE WAS TRIABLE IS-
SUES OF LAW AND FACT AND THEREFORE CONTRARY 
TO THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
rrhe lower Court either ignored or overlooked the 
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laws of the State of Utah as layed down by this Court 
in the case of Baur v. Pacific Finance Co. et. al. found 
at 383 P.2d 397. In that case the Court held and stated 
as follows: 
"We have heretofore declared, the granting a 
motion to dismiss, which deprives the party of 
the privilege of presenting his evidence, is a harsh 
measure 'vhich Courts should grant only when it 
clearly appears that taking the view most favor-
able to the Complaint and any facts which might 
properly be proved thereunder, no right to redress 
could be established; and unless it so clearly ap-
pears, doubt should be resolved in favor of allow-
ing him the opportunity to present his proof." 
See also: Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 
344. 
In citing the above cases this writer draws the 
Court's attention to the appellants Answer (R 29, 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34) wherein the appellants have denied all 
of the allegations contained in the respondent's Com-
plaint (Rl and 2) and denied the guaranty of any 
amount to Evans and Black Carpet Mills d/b/a E & B 
Carpet Mills, Inc. That all respondents and the assignors 
are out of state corporations with no registered agents 
in Utah. 
Further, the appellants stated set offs against two 
of the assignors of the respondent who are not parties 
to this action ( R 33, 34.) The Stipulation signed by the 
appellants also make provisions to exclude their set offs 
and this wrikr submits to this Honorable body that 
the assignor Bailey-Schmitz is an indispensable party 
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as set forth under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
1953 under Rule 19. 
NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES: 
"Subject to th0 provision of Rule 23 and of sub-
division (b) of this rule, persons having a joint 
interest shall be made parties and be joined on 
the same side as plaintiffs and defendants. When 
a person who should join as a plaintiff refuses 
to do so, or his consent cannot be obtained, he 
may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an 
involuntary plaintiff." 
This writer submits that unless Bailey-Schmitz is > 
forced to become a party in this action that justice will 
not be obtained and the result would be unconcionable 
],ecanse the appellants would have to bring legal action 
in the State of California against Bailey-Schmitz on their 
setoff when all of said issues should be handled at one 
time in an effort to avoid multiple suits. 
It would appear therefore to this writer that there 
were triable issues of law and fact, the Court should 
have allowed the appellants the right to file an amended 
Answer and Counterclaim and if necessary such addi-
tional pleadings as to join all necessary parties before 
the Court so that equitable and substantial justice would 
he done to all of the parties concerned. 
POINT 4. 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING AP-
PELLANTS MOTION WHEN THE APPELLANTS DID IN 
FACT HA VE A GOOD AND VALID DEFENSE OF MIS-
JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND MISJOINDER OF PARTIES AND 
THEREFORE CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of 
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Stank v. Jones, 40L1 P.2d 9G4, 17 Utah 2d 96, a 19GfJ 
Utah Case, decided this issue. 
The facts in that case were that the plaintiff, a resi-
dent of Colorado, filed a Complaint containing twelve 
causes of action which were allegedly assigned by seven 
independent corporations and creditors and with each 
cause having unrelated facts. The twelve cause of actions 
were assigned for purposes of suit and collection; the 
assignors retained a two-thirds interest in the amount 
to be collected which was $76,000.00. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah stated on 
Page 965 and 966 as follows: 
"Obviously, the seven assignors could not have 
joined as })laintiffs and asserted their diverse and 
unrelated claims in one action against the defend-
ant. Why, then, should they be allowed to do in-
directly what they could not do directly~ 
* * * 
The claim of misjoinder was raised for the first 
time on this interlocutory appeal. However, in 
view of the fact that this accumulation of un-
related claims and the attempt to fuse them into 
a composjte one produces an incongruity dis-
ruptive of proper and orderly procedure, we a:e 
impelled to remand this cause for proceedings _rn 
accordance with the conclusion stated in this opm-
ion." 
The Supreme Court in the Stank case held there 
was a misjoinder of parties sent it back to the lower 
Court and reversed the lower Court which held for the 
plaintiff on its Complaint. In the concurring opinion 
the Court stated: 
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"Rule 20 (permissive joinder) the latter is conclu-
sive in requiring that even if there could be a 
joindc·r the claims must at least arise out of the 
same transaction, - a circumstance wholly absent 
here." 
'l1 lte facts in the instant case before this Honorable 
body is almost identical to the Stank case in that the 
respondent in its original Complaint filed two unrelated 
causes of action against the appellants (R 1, 2) and 
further tlte respondent in its Complaint stated that the 
appellants would not be entitled to any setoffs, defenses 
or counterclaims which is contrary to the laws of the 
f-ltate of Utah as stated in the Stank v. Jones case on 
Page 966. 
"An assignee dot's not acquire any greater right 
than that possessed by his assignor." 
It would appear therefore that when appellants at-
tonwy in arguing his Motion argued that there was a 
misjoinder of claims and a misjoinder of parties the 
Court should have granted appellants Motion to file an 
.Amc'rnled Answer and Counterclaim and if necessary 
bring in all the necessary parties since two of the as-
signors are foreign corporations and unless the appel-
lants can bring in these parties they would be irreparably 
injured. Even the Stipulation provides that the appel-
lants reserv<-> the right to any setoffs against one- of 
tlw assignors, to-wit: Bailey-Schmitz Company. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1953 
ac: anwnded state as follows: 
"Nece::;sary joinder of parties (a) Necessary join-
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der. Subject to tlw provisions of Rule 23 and of 
~l~bdi.vision (b) of this rule, persons having a 
JOmt mterest shall be made parties and be joined 
on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. 
When a person who should join as a plaintiff 
refuses to do so, or his consent cannot be obtained 
' he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, 
an involuntary plaintiff." 
It would appear therefore that under our Rules of 
Civil Procedure and in lieu of the Stank case that the 
Court erred in not granting the appellants the Motion 
as stated herein. 
POINT 5. 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT A JUDGMENT SINCE THE COURT HAD NO 
JURISDICTION TO GRANT SAID JUDGMENT. 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1953 
as amended in 1964 provides the following: 
"Rule 3. Commencement of action. (a) How Com-
menced. 
A Civil Action is commenced (1) by filing a com-
plaint with the Court, or (2) by the service of a Sum-
mons. If the action is commenced by the service of 
a Summons, the Complaint, together with the Summons 
and Proof of Service thereof, must be filed within ten 
days after such service and a copy of the Complaint 
shall be served upon or mailed to the defendant if his 
address is known; if unknown, a copy must be deposited 
with the Clerk for him, or the action thus commenced 
shall be deemed dismissed and the Court shall have 
no further jurisdiction thereof; provided however, that 
the foregoing provisions shall not change the require-
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ment of Section 12-1-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953." 
This writer draws the Court's attention to the docu-
ill<'nt entitled Acceptance of Service of Summons dated 
Jrnw 8, 1966, and signed by the instant writer (R 3). 
11he record is devoid that a copy of the Complaint was 
1·ver received or that the appellants attorney ever ac-
knowledged the acceptance of a copy of the Complaint 
and this writer draws the Court's attention to the Com-
plaint (R 1, 2) and note that nowhere does a Certificate 
of Mailing show that a copy of the Complaint was at 
any time ever mailed to the appellants attorney, whose 
address was well known since the Acceptance of Service 
had previously been mailed to him and this writer draws 
tl1c Court's attention to the fact that all other docu-
ments in the record show Certificates of Mailing with 
the exception of the Complaint which at no time shows 
that a Complaint was mailed to appellants attorney or 
that a copy of the Complaint was filed with the Clerk's 
Office and as stated in Rule 3, since this is jurisdictional, 
the failure of the respondent to either mail a copy of 
the Complaint to the appellants or to file a copy with 
the Clerk of the Court, the Court lost the jurisdiction 
to enter any further orders and that all orders entered 
thereunder are void and should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectively sub-
mitted that the failure of the lower Court to grant ap-
Jl<'llants Motion to set aside the Stipulation and for leave 
to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim should 
l1avc' been granted and the lower Court erred in granting 
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Judgment to the respondent smce the Court had lost 
its jurisdiction and the matter should be reversed and 
remanded back to the lower Court where the matter 
should be dismissed in its entirety with all monies paid 
thereunder being returned to the appellants by the 
respondent. That as alternative relief the appellant is 
requesting that the matter be remanded back to the lower 
Court so that the appellants can file an Amended An-
swer and Counterclajm so as to assert all of its legal 
and equitable defenses in Court so as to receive and 
avail themselves of due process of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
Attorney for Appellants 
and Defendants 
302 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
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AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS. 
COUNTY OF \VEBER 
PETE VLAHOS, being first duly sworn upon 
his oath deposes and says: 
That he is an Attorney practising law in Ogden, 
Utah, with his offices at 302 Eccles Bldg., Ogden, Utah, 
and authorized and licensed to practice law by the State 
of Utah in and for the State of Utah. 
That as a duly licensed attorney your affiant herein 
came to represent the defendants and appellants in the 
matter before this Court and on or about August 15th, 
19G7, appeared before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
upon a Motion to set aside a Stipulation and for leave 
to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 
That included in your affiant's argument to the 
Court was the fact that there was a misjoinder of 
parties and a misjoinder of actions which the trans-
cript is void of. 
That this Affidavit is given in support of appellants 
argument to the Supreme Court as one of the points 
that the lower Court erred in denying appellants Motion. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 1967. 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
8ubscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of 
November, 1967. 
JOLENE ZANDEL 
Notary Public 
Residing at Ogden, Utah 
My Commission Expires 6-5-69 
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AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS: 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
PETE N. VLAHOS, being first duly sworn upon 
his oath deposes and says: 
That he is a duly dicensed attorney authorized to 
practice law in the State of Utah with his offices lo-
cated at 302 Eccles Bldg., Ogden, Utah. 
That on or about June 8th, 1966, your affiant herein 
accepted service of a Summons in the matter of United 
Factors, a Corporation vs. T. C. Associates, Inc., pend-
ing in the District Court of Salt Lake County, bearing 
Civil No. 165056. 
That on or about June 13th, 1966, your affiant was 
stricken what was his doctor thought to be a second 
heart attack within two months and was hopsitalized 
at the St. Benedict's Hospital from that date until 
September 1st, 1966, when your affiant again resumed 
the practise of law at his same address hereinafter de-
signated. 
That your affiant further states that at no time 
during said period of time did he receive a copy of a 
Complaint and that his Acceptance was only for the 
Summons and not for a Complaint which has never 
been mailed or served upon your affiant herein. 
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That this Affidavit is given in support of the appel-
lants Appeal before the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah which is pending and for which Briefs are to be 
filed. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 1967. 
PETE N. VLAHOS, 
Affiant and Attorney for Appellant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day 
of November, 1967. 
JOLENE ZANDEL 
Notary Public 
Residing at Ogden, Utah 
My Commission Expires 6-5-69 
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